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policies and the 
ideological crisis 
Raúl Prebisch 
In his recent articles, and especially in his latest 
book (Capitalismo periférico. Crisis y transforma-
ción, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico City, 
1981), the author pays special attention to the role 
played by monetary mechanisms in peripheral cap-
italism and to the meaning and limits of their use by 
the monetary authority. The ideas he expressed gen-
erated various critical comments which have led him 
to present , in the first part of this article, a new 
version of his views which, while respecting the 
original structure, incorporates some additional re-
flections. Thus , after reaffirming the essence of his 
thesis on the role of monetary mechanisms in the 
appropriation of the surplus, he examines how these 
instruments also play a decisive role in the defence 
of this surplus. On the basis of this theoretical clarifi-
Attempts to interpret peripheral development 
within the framework of neoclassical theories 
are pointless if they do not take into account the 
structure of society and the phenomena which 
occur as technology from the centres pene-
trates into it. 
These are extremely important phenome-
na which, impelled by the internal logic of 
peripheral capitalism, tend in time to lead the 
system into an inflation-fuelled crisis of a social 
nature which is impossible to explain by using 
such theories. Monetary measures can neither 
explain nor effectively attack such a problem. 
From the ranks of the neoclassicists —not 
all of them, of course— have arisen the mon-
etarists, who try to apply these measures while 
ignoring the true nature of the phenomena re-
sponsible for social inflation. 
The inflationary crisis of the system is, in 
the last analysis, the outcome of a distributive 
struggle characterized by the interplay of 
power relations in the course of the structural 
changes which accompany the progressive 
penetration of technology from the centres; and 
this distributive struggle has its origin in the 
great social inequality of peripheral capitalism. 
Few will dispute the persistence of this phe-
nomenon. Efforts have been made to correct 
it through various redistributive measures, 
which have undoubtedly had some positive ef-
fects. But in the long run they themselves have 
he lped to provoke the serious upheavals of so-
cial inflation. 
One may seek all kinds of explanations for 
this. In my opinion, however, there is one basic 
explanation: the dynamic of the system is 
based on social inequality whose origin lies in 
the structural phenomenon of the economic 
surplus which is appropriated by the upper 
strata of society, where most of the means of 
production are concentrated. As explained in 
previous studies, the existence of a large mass 
of people with lower productivity and lower 
income prevents that part of the labour force 
which is employed at growing levels of produc-
tivity thanks to the accumulation of capital from 
raising its wages in a corresponding fashion. 
The re is a regressive competition within the 
labour force when the market forces are fully in 
play, and the portion of the increase in produc-
cation, he criticizes the way in which monetary me-
chanisms have been applied in recent 'monetarist' 
experiments in Latin America, and sounds awarning 
about their effectiveness and consequences. 
In the second part he deals especially with trade 
and financial 'openness ' policies and the form and 
effects they have had in Latin America, in the light of 
the centre periphery relationship and the interests 
dominat ing this. Both monetarism and economic 
openness are theoretical manifestations which orig-
inated in the centres and have shown that they do not 
serve the fundamental interests of peripheral devel-
opment , which can only b e satisfied by a tenacious 
effort towards intellectual emancipation. 
"Director oiCEPAL Review. 
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tivity which is not transferred to the labour 
force is the economic surplus. 
The growth of the economic surplus is a 
dynamic necessity of the system, since it is the 
source of most of the reproductive capital 
whose accumulation multiplies productivity 
and employment. But at the same time a con-
siderable part of this surplus is used for the 
privileged consumption of the upper strata, and 
this consumption expands as the surplus grows, 
to the detriment of accumulation. 
In the course of development, the middle 
and eventually the lower social strata naturally 
try to raise their own private and social con-
sumption by placing pressure on the distribu-
tion scheme, either directly, through their 
trade union power, or through the government, 
while the latter also increases its civil and mil-
itary consumption. 
What happens, however, is that this expan-
sion of consumption in the distributive strug-
gle does not occur at the expense of privileged 
consumption, but rather is superimposed on 
it. And this is the origin of the social inflation 
upheavals, for if the rate of all these forms of 
consumption exceeds the rate of productivity, 
slowing down the growth of the surplus, the 
system reacts with an inflationary rise in prices: 
it cannot continue regularly to fufil this dy-
namic requirement. 
As already noted, the surplus is explained 
by the heterogeneity of the social structure, 
where there is a great variety of levels of tech-
nology and productivity. It is thus a structural 
phenomenon, but monetary mechanisms play a 
prime role in its appropriation. 
Monetary mechanisms are far from neutral. 
They not only allow the upper strata to appro-
priate the surplus, but are also a factor in its 
defence. It is a serious theoretical as well as 
practical error to consider money indepen-
dently of the productive process, to which mo-
netary mechanisms are closely linked. 
I mentioned above the relations of power. 
The development of the redistributive power 
of the labour force and the State accompanies 
the process of democratization as the latter pro-
gresses and begins to overcome the obstacles in 
its path. This is one of the important conse-
quences of the changes in the societal structure 
which occur as technology penetrates the so-
ciety. 
The distributive struggle attempts to co-
rrect social inequality, and manages to do so up 
to a certain limit without entering into conflict 
with the growth of the surplus, thanks to suc-
cessive increases in productivity. Beyond this 
critical limit, however, the dynamic of the 
surplus becomes involved. 
When this limit has been reached, mone-
tary mechanisms play their defensive role. The 
incompatibility between the different forms of 
consumption referred to above and accumula-
tion shows up in the rise in prices. By using 
monetary mechanisms, it is possible to coun-
teract this rise through credit restrictions, 
which lead to a recession or contraction of 
economic activity and resulting unemploy-
ment. This unemployment then causes a de-
cline in wages if the redistributive power of 
the labour force and its ability to pass on the 
burden of taxes which falls on its shoulders are 
weak or non-existent. 
The labour force thus has to give way in its 
redistributive effort, if government expendi-
tures are not reduced and the upper strata, by 
using their political power, evade the tax bur-
den. 
There is thus an indispensable condition if 
the monetary mechanisms are to be able to ef-
fectively defend the surplus and hence ac-
cumulation and the privileged consumption of 
the upper strata: the non-existence or weakness 
of the trade union and political power of labour. 
But when this power becomes stronger in the 
course of structural changes, the labour force, 
and especially its middle strata, resists the drop 
in wages. When this happens, the tightening of 
credit brings with it recession or contraction in 
the economy, with consequent unemployment, 
while the companies transfer to prices the 
higher wages of the labour still employed. 
Thus, the inflationary spiral and unemploy-
ment coexist. Sooner or later, however, the in-
tensity of these phenomena and their adverse 
effects on the companies themselves and on the 
government force the monetary authorities to 
relax credit in order to stimulate the economy. 
There is thus a new impulse which tends to 
accelerate inflation. The monetary mech-
anisms are left powerless; they have become 
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obsolete in the later stages of structural changes 
and the progress of the democratization pro-
cess. 
The Latin American periphery is not char-
acterized by the solidity of its democratic insti-
tutions. When the redistributive power has 
gained strength and unemployment cannot 
bring it back in line, an attempt is made to do so 
by means of the military power of the State, 
thus restoring the dynamic of the surplus and 
privileged consumption. It would also be pos-
sible to raise the rate of accumulation at the 
expense of such consumption, but there is no 
spontaneous way of doing so. It would be nec-
essary to take deliberate measures to reduce 
privileged consumption, and this is hard to re-
concile with the euphoria which usually pre-
vails in the dominant groups when resort is had 
to the use of military force. 
There is a huge social and political cost in 
restoring the surplus, and if, in the course of 
time, the process of democratization is re-
newed, there is a risk of a new inflationary 
cycle if the system of appropriation and distri-
bution of the fruits of technical progress is not 
tackled at its roots. It would be a tremendous 
error to try to go back in time without effecting 
such a transformation. 
1. The role of monetary mechanisms 
in social inequality 
Monetary mechanisms play a dual role which is 
closely linked to the societal structure and its 
changes. Above all, they must create enough 
money for total demand to coincide with the 
total supply of final goods, which has grown 
bigger because of the increases in both employ-
ment and productivity. Thanks to such mech-
anisms, this productivity can be exploited by 
the companies in the form of a surplus for the 
owners of the means of production, without 
This is what I now propose to demonstrate. 
It is not a question of going back to the situation 
of a decade or two ago, nor to some remote past. 
Anyone who believes that neoclassicism is a 
great theoretical innovation seems not to have 
noticed that this theory prevailed in the periods 
of the outward-oriented growth of the periphe-
ry, before the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
This study is based on ideas set forth in 
other previous studies published in CEPAL 
Review and in Capitalismo Periférico,1 a book 
which systematizes and condenses them. In 
writing this article the criticisms and sugges-
tions received and my own clarification of pre-
vious ideas have been very useful. I should also 
cite two works published after this book, 
namely, "La crisis inflacionaria del capita-
lismo", published in El Trimestre Económico, 
Mexico City, Vol. XLIX, No. 193, January-
March 1982, and a recent monograph, Teoría y 
práctica de la ortodoxia, presented at the in-
ternational seminar on economic policies and 
the prospects for democracy in Latin America 
of the 1980s, organized by the Latin American 
Institute for Social Research (ILDIS) and held 
in Quito, Ecuador, in April 1982. 
lowering prices. Monetary mechanisms thus 
fulfil their role of sustaining social inequality. 
Monetary mechanisms also have to defend 
the surplus from the distributive struggle, in 
such a way that its growth allows more capital 
to be accumulated while at the same time per-
mitting the privileged consumption of the 
upper strata to rise. These mechanisms thus 
place a limit on the redistribution of the fruits of 
lCapitalismo periférico. Crisis y transformación, Me-
xico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1981. 
I 
Monetary mechanisms in the appropriation and defence 
of the surplus 
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technical progress, or on the progressive cor-
rection of structural inequalities. Let us first 
examine the role of monetary mechanisms in 
the appropriation of these fruits. 
2. The appropriation of the surplus 
To understand this, we must answer the follow-
ing simple question. If in the course of the 
production process the wages of the labour 
force only rise in accordance with part of the 
increase in productivity, since much of this is 
appropriated in the form of a surplus by the 
owners of the means of production, then how 
do we explain the fact that the total demand 
originating in this labour income can absorb 
the entire increase in productivity which aug-
ments the total supply of final goods? 
The answer is also very simple. If the de-
mand came from the wages paid to obtain the 
corresponding supply, it would be insufficient 
to absorb the latter and the prices would fall as 
productivity rose. This would occur if produc-
tion were stationary; but this is not the case in 
the dynamics of development, because the in-
come from which this demand arises does not 
come from present supply but from a greater 
supply in course of production, from which the 
corresponding final goods will come after a cer-
tain time. The growth in demand thus antici-
pates the future supply by directing itself to-
wards the present supply and thus absorbing in 
the form of a surplus the increase in productivi-
ty-
To understand this phenomenon we must 
take into account the time that the production 
process takes. A certain time passes between 
the primary stages of production and the output 
of the final goods. In all the stages of this pro-
cess the companies pay income to the labour 
force, from which total demand arises. But this 
income does not wait to be spent until the co-
rresponding final goods are produced at the 
end of a certain time; instead, it becomes a 
demand for goods which already exist in the 
market and whose production process began 
some time back.2 
2The famous Say's law said that supply creates its own 
demand. Expressing ourselves in the same language, we 
If we look at a given period over the grow-
ing course of production, the demand for final 
goods comes from the income which, during 
the same period, is paid to the labour force in 
the different stages of the productive processes 
in progress during this period. Now, this in-
come being paid by the companies is greater 
than the income which was paid before in order 
to obtain the supply entering the market in the 
period under consideration. Present demand 
thus exceeds the demand which would have 
been recorded if present demand had come 
from the income paid previously to obtain the 
present supply. This is indispensable in order 
that the increase in productivity reflected in 
this final supply, plus the growth in production 
resulting from higher employment, may be ab-
sorbed without prices falling. 
If the demand is sufficient to absorb all the 
supply without a drop in prices, this is the 
market's signal for production to continue to 
increase. This signal is transmitted back to all 
the stages of the process in progress. Thus, the 
companies which have sold more final goods 
than before increase the demand for goods in 
process produced by the companies of the pre-
ceding stage; and the latter in turn augment the 
demand for goods from the previous stage, all 
the way back to the primary goods stage. 
This demand between companies, which 
has thus been moving backward, causes partial 
surpluses to arise in the course of the produc-
tion process. It cannot therefore be expected 
that the total surplus will appear when the final 
goods enter the market, as if a single company 
were handling all the production processes: on 
the contrary, the surplus also appears in ad-
vance in the different stages. 
In order to pay the growing wages corre-
sponding to the greater employment of labour 
and the increase in partial surpluses, the com-
panies have to increase their availability of 
money correspondingly by resorting to the 
banking system. The money which they pay 
out in this way comes back to them when they 
sell the goods at the various stages up until the 
would say that today's supply does not create its own de-
mand, but this demand is created by the supply which is in 
process and from which final goods will later emerge. 
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final goods stage. In this way the companies 
obtain from each stage the corresponding sur-
plus and recover the money they have already 
paid to labour. And these funds thus recovered, 
plus and additional creation of money, allow 
them to continue to increase the production in 
progress. 
Let us follow this same reasoning by suc-
cessive approximations. Not all the money 
used by the companies is immediately trans-
formed into demand for final goods; part is di-
rected towards demand for services, which ab-
sorb quite a large portion of the money created 
in order to increase the production in progress, 
and this money gradually returns to the com-
panies in the form of demand for final goods. 
Let us consider the nature of this de-
mand which is diverted to services. It means 
that a part of the money corresponding to the 
wages paid by the companies, and the partial 
surpluses they obtain, temporarily stops being 
spent on goods and takes the form of demand 
for services. Any formation of capital requires 
corresponding saving; thus, the production in 
progress which has to increase in order for the 
supply of final goods to grow in its turn re-
presents the circulating capital or working ca-
pital of the companies and is thus covered by 
the temporary saving in question, which 
should not be confused with the saving re-
quired for the accumulation of fixed capital. 
Before finishing this section we should 
briefly recall the mechanism which allows the 
monetary authority to fulfil its regulatory func-
tion as a stabilizer of prices. It is guided by 
symptoms. If the creation of money is excessive 
in relation to the growth of supply, due to the 
increase in employment and productivity, 
prices will tend to rise, with the resulting ex-
ternal imbalance, and this will slow down the 
expansion of money until a new equilibrium is 
reached, provided the monetary authority does 
nothing to counteract the initial expansion. 
One of the most important factors in the rise in 
prices is the increase in labour wages, whose 
significance we will now consider. 
In order to simplify our explanation, we 
had not yet introduced this factor. We do so 
now so that we can examine the other important 
role of the monetary mechanisms, for, as we 
have said, besides being an instrument of ap-
propriation they are also an instrument for the 
defence of the surplus against the attacks it 
suffers in the distributive struggle. 
3. The defence of the surplus 
Let us now introduce the notion of rates in 
order to clarify our reasoning. 
For the system to function normally, the 
rate of growth of labour pay must maintain a 
close relationship with the rate of increase in 
productivity. 
The rate of pay rises either when the la-
bour force attempts to augment its share in the 
increase in productivity at the expense of the 
growth of the surplus, or when compensation is 
given, through an increase in wages, for a rise 
in prices resulting from higher government 
taxes which affect it in one way or another. It 
also tries to secure compensation for other 
price increases such as those resulting from 
imports or from inelasticity of the domestic 
supply of certain goods, that is to say, from 
factors which do not originate in the distrib-
utive struggle. 
At all events, we must make a clear distinc-
tion between the pressure of distribution and 
that of compensation in order to understand the 
bias of the system in favour of the upper strata 
through the monetary defence mechanism. 
When the wage rate rises above the rate of 
productivity, no matter how this occurs, the 
companies will demand a rise in the rate of 
money creation in order to pay the higher 
wages. 
If they manage to obtain this greater quan-
tity of money, the wage increases will inevita-
bly be transferred to prices to the extent that the 
rate of increase in productivity has been ex-
ceeded. 
There is thus an inflationary increase in 
prices which the monetary authority will try to 
correct if it fulfils its stabilizing function. This 
is the role of monetary mechanisms. Their co-
rrective effectiveness depends on the flexibili-
ty of wages. In view of the nature of the system, 
wages must fall; whether they do this or not 
depends on the strength of the trade unions and 
the political power of the labour force. 
In both cases this phenomenon could be 
schematically explained as follows. Once the 
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rise in prices has occurred, if the monetary au-
thority refuses to continue to provide addition-
al money to keep paying the higher wages the 
companies are obliged (insofar as they cannot 
directly force a reduction in wages) to use part 
of the flow of money available to them before 
the increase in wages to pay for this increase. 
As a result, they will not have enough money to 
keep on increasing the level of employment 
and of the production in progress. 
T h e extent to which the rate of growth of 
employment begins to slow down in this way 
will depend on the intensity of the restrictive 
monetary policy. Such is the direct effect on 
employment and future supply. But there is 
also an immediate impact on total demand for 
finished goods. As the money flow destined for 
production in progress diminishes, the rate of 
total demand is insufficient to match the rate at 
which the supply of final goods had been grow-
ing, and this insufficiency in demand is trans-
ferred back to the different stages of the pro-
duction process. The initial restriction on the 
creation of money thus causes a recession in 
productive activity, with resulting unemploy-
ment , and this unemployment allows the com-
panies to cut back wages if the trade union and 
political power of labour is weak or non-exis-
tent. 
This is the social cost of restoring the dy-
namic of the surplus through monetary mech-
anisms. 
It is true that the total surplus also shrinks 
insofar as the reduced demand among the com-
panies at the different stages of the process 
br ings along with it a decrease in the partial 
surpluses. This is only a temporary phenome-
non, however, since when the economy later 
recovers, these partial surpluses begin to rise 
once more, inasmuch as labour does not have 
the power to win an increase in wages again, or 
the companies refuse to grant such an increase 
in the face of the threat of a firm, stabilizing 
att i tude on the part of the monetary authority. 
For the neoclassical economists, this read-
jus tment in wages is one of the great virtues of 
the system, since to them the trade union and 
political pressure of labour represents an arbi-
trary interference in the laws of the market. 
This would be a reasonable criticism if under 
these laws the fruits of technological progress 
were passed on to all levels of society through 
decreases in prices, as they assume. We know, 
however, that the system does not work like 
this, since only a part of these fruits is trans-
ferred to the labour force; another more or less 
large part is retained in the form of the surplus 
by the owners of the means of production. 
This is what leads to the social inequity of 
the so-called 'virtues' of the system. Consump-
tion on the part of the labour force must be 
reduced in order to re-establish the surplus and 
permit not only accumulation but also pri-
vileged consumption by the favoured social 
strata. 
I t is true that the growth of accumulation is 
an inevitable requirement —in whatever sys-
tem— for increasing employment with growing 
productivity. However, peripheral capitalism 
suffers from severe asymmetry in this respect. 
If the limiting of consumption on the part of 
the labour force is imposed in order to fulfil 
this dynamic requirement, the fact remains 
that there is no provision in the system for 
limiting the privileged consumption of the 
favoured strata. On the contrary, increasing 
imitation of the forms of consumption of the 
centres is occurring, to the clear detriment of 
vigorous development. And there is nothing in 
the system which imposes a reduction of this 
privileged consumption in order to favour ac-
cumulation. But consumption on the part of the 
labour force does have to be reduced, by mon-
etary mechanisms, when it threatens priv-
ileged consumption. 
This is not the only way the regressive bias 
of the system manifests itself, however. We 
already explained that wage increases, as well 
as reflecting the efforts on the part of labour to 
share in the fruits of technological progress, are 
also explainable by the desire to compensate 
for the unfavourable effects of price increases 
resulting from government taxes or external or 
domestic factors outside the distributive strug-
gle. This action to seek compensation through 
wage increases is also subject, as in the pre-
vious case, to the restrictive policy of the mon-
etary authority, and when the instrument at the 
latter's disposal is used in this way and causes 
unemployment, wages have to go down, not 
only by the amount they had genuinely risen, 
but by the amount they had managed to gain as 
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compensation for the effect of these other price 
increases. Thus, in the last analysis, these in-
creases do not hurt privileged consumption but 
the consumption on the part of the labour force. 
Such is the virtue of the readjustment brought 
about by the monetary mechanisms: a virtue 
for some, but downright social inequality for 
others. 
We have spoken of the effectiveness of 
monetary mechanisms when the redistributive 
power of the labour force is non-existent or very 
weak. This is so in those phases of structural 
change when the process of democratization is 
incipient or is manipulated in one way or an-
other by the dominant groups. But when this 
process advances and the labour force acquires 
t rade union and political strength, the mone-
tary mechanisms again become incapable of 
s lowing down the redistributive power. 
How does the system react, then, to an 
increase in the wage rate beyond the productiv-
ity rate? The initial reaction is the same as that 
of the previous case: the restrictive policy of 
the monetary authority forces the companies to 
divert a part of the monetary flow for the pay-
m e n t of higher wages, with a consequent de-
crease in the rate of the production in progress. 
T h e result is unemployment. But unlike what 
happens in the other case, here the labour force 
does not accept a cut in its wages, and the com-
panies therefore transfer to prices the in-
creased costs caused by the diversion of the 
monetary flow, to the detriment of the produc-
tion in progress. Since the redistributive power 
is strong, however, the rise in prices is followed 
by a new compensatory rise in wages, although 
of only temporary effect, giving rise to the fa-
miliar spiral. 
Now if the monetary authority continues 
with its restrictive policy, the companies will 
have to further increase the diversion of money 
to finance the inflationary growth of wages, 
and in this way they will deprive the produc-
tion in progress of the money needed to keep it 
growing at the previous rate. If the pressure of 
the employed labour force continues, without 
the monetary authority attenuating or changing 
its restrictive policy, the recession will then 
turn into active contraction. It is at this point 
that the dual phenomenon of inflation and 
unemployment which did not occur in the pre-
vious phases of the structural evolution ap-
pears. The monetary mechanisms have not on-
ly become impotent, but actually counterpro-
ductive, for in addition to the fairly large loss it 
suffers due to unemployment, the surplus fluc-
tuates continually: it grows when prices rise 
and shrinks when wages rise in a new turn of 
the spiral. 
Is there any way out of this inflationary 
crisis, for which the intrinsic logic of the sys-
tem is itself responsible? Neoclassical econ-
omists who hold monetaristic beliefs advocate 
persisting with the restrictive policy until la-
bour resigns itself to accepting a reduction in 
its real wages and does not insist on being com-
pensated, wholly or partially, for the rise in 
prices. It is possible that the risk of unemploy-
men t spreading to those who are still employed 
may become a flexibility factor in wage nego-
tiations. 
Indeed, when inflation grows serious and 
unemployment becomes high, labour is usual-
ly more disposed to consider social pacts. But 
this willingness, besides having certain draw-
backs, is only temporary, since when the 
economy recovers and employment increases, 
the redistributive pressure arises again, and the 
system is exposed to a new cycle of inflationary 
spiral and unemployment. I do not believe 
there is any way to avoid this, except through a 
new system of appropriation and redistribution 
of the fruits of technological progress, obvious-
ly not along neoclassical principles. 
I t is not surprising, then, that some pro-
ponents of this school of thought are now talk-
ing about the advisability of constantly main-
taining a minimun unemployment level, like 
the sword of Damocles, in order to contain the 
rise in wages during the reactivation of the 
economy. Does it follow, then, that this waste 
of factors of production signifies their optimal 
allocation according to those principles? Far 
from it, since the potential for accumulation is 
diminishing, to the clear detriment of the ab-
sorption of labour from the lower strata and the 
general improvement of the productivity of the 
ent i re economy. 
Before going on to the next point, let us 
look for a moment at one very important aspect. 
We have already explained that the upheavals 
of the system occur when the wage rate rises 
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above the productivity rate. The latter de-
pends, on the one hand, on the accumulation of 
reproductive capital and, on the other, on the 
growing skills which the penetration of tech-
nology requires the labour force to possess. 
Thus, in capitalistic development, there is a 
clear tendency towards a rise in productivity 
through a rise in the level of labour skills, even 
if there has not been a rise in the rate of ac-
cumulation of reproductive capital. To the ex-
tent that this occurs and the wage rate is not out 
of line with that of productivity, the system 
functions normally and wages, as well as the 
surplus, evolve without any upheavals of a re-
distributive nature. 
This observation is important, since with-
out this increase in the productivity rate (and in 
that arising from a higher rate of reproductive 
accumulation) we cannot explain the effective 
and persistent improvement in labour's stan-
dard of living over the course of development. 
Another significant observation is the fol-
lowing: we have referred to the social expendi-
tures of the State (social consumption). Un-
doubtedly this has contributed to the rise in the 
efficiency of labour. In addition, State invest-
ments in infrastructure have formed part of the 
reproductive capital and thus have effectively 
participated, along with accumulation by com-
panies, in the rise of employment and pro-
ductivity. 
There is another aspect we should also 
mention. Remember that the surplus is a phe-
nomenon which results from structural hetero-
geneity. When the accumulation of capital is 
very active, so too is the transfer of workers 
from relatively low technical levels of produc-
tion to others with growing productivity. The 
phenomenon of regressive competition is thus 
weakened, as is the capacity to appropriate the 
surplus. Wages thus tend to rise more than pro-
ductivity, independently of the exercise of re-
distributive power. And no matter how hard the 
monetary authority tries to contain this rise in 
wages through the well-known mechanisms at 
its disposal, the readjustment of the system will 
not be able to force wages down, since the 
improvement is a structural one. The economic 
recovery policy will have to recognize this fact 
and the resulting rise in prices. However, in 
view of its nature, this phenomenon occurs 
rather slowly and the system gradually adapts 
itself to it. At all events, this has an adverse 
effect on the rate of the surplus, the capacity for 
accumulation and the rate of growth of em-
ployment. In this way the system spontaneous-
ly slows down the correction of regressive com-
petition. This is one more proof that the dy-
namics of the system are ultimately based on 
social inequality. 
4. The use of military power 
I shall not be so foolish as to maintain that the 
employment of the military poweiof the State 
to contain the inflationary increase in wages is a 
result of neoclassical thinking. It is a complex 
political phenomenon which, although it may 
be explained by the increasingly serious up-
heavals accompanying the inflationary crisis in 
the system, is also the result of other factors 
which have occurred in the historical develop-
ment of the periphery in the past, before the 
redistributive power of labour and the State 
became prominent. 
There can be no doubt, however, that some 
neoclassical economists approve of the inter-
vention of military power in order to subdue 
the trade union and political power of labour 
and correct its violation of the laws of the mar-
ket. 
How can the continuation of the spiral, 
which the monetary mechanisms have not 
been able to contain, be averted? Simply by 
subjugating the power of labour, in order to 
apply the formula mentioned earlier in regard 
to wages: preventing their increase in the spiral 
while leaving prices free to 'seek their own 
level'. 
The surplus, free from interference, re-
covers its growth. I have said more than once 
that the restoration of the surplus provides the 
opportunity to raise the rate of reproductive 
accumulation above its previous level. But to 
do this it would be necessary to contain the 
evolution of the privileged consumption of the 
favoured strata. There is no spontaneous mech-
anism in the system for achieving this positive 
effect; on the contrary, we have frequently 
witnessed a veritable orgy of consumption 
which tends to contaminate part of the middle 
strata, the usual supporters of military power. 
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Another very significant fact is the conti-
nuation of inflation despite the fact that the 
wages of most of the labour force have been 
frozen. This is due to the persistence or recru-
descence of traditional forms of inflation, es-
pecially of fiscal origin. 
Another of the vehement aspirations of the 
neoclassicists is the dismantling of the State in 
order to make it subsidiary or dispensable. 
These efforts, however, are not usually as suc-
cessful as expected. While some spending, es-
pecially of a social nature, is reduced, other 
spending —generally related to the new po-
litical régime— is increased. The State thus 
fails to observe one of the primary recommen-
dations of fiscal orthodoxy, as well as that of 
increasing taxes in order to pay the deficit. This 
latter measure may be effective if the power of 
labour to seek compensatory wage rises is elim-
inated. In this case, the tax would no longer be 
inflationary, even if it fell on the labour force; 
as for possible burdens on the upper strata, the 
strengthening of their political power places 
them out of danger in this respect. 
Thus, it is not surprising that fiscal-gen-
erated inflation springs up. The truth is that it is 
a tolerable form of inflation for the dominant 
groups as long as it does not hurt the dynamic of 
the surplus. On the contrary, it inflates the 
surplus and thus offers more scope for the 
readjustment of wages, as long as the real sur-
plus can continue to grow. In any case, these 
readjustments represent a certain psychologi-
cal relief for labour, which has already suffered 
from shrinking wages. 
The consequences of fiscal inflation are 
thus ultimately felt by labour, since it acts to the 
detriment of their consumption rather than that 
of the favoured strata. It is thus compatible with 
the dynamics of the system. 
The same is true of inflation of external 
origin, as well as that resulting from domestic 
factors other than the distributive struggle, as 
mentioned elsewhere in this article. The ef-
fects are likewise felt by labour and not by the 
surplus, insofar as a compensatory increase in 
wages is not allowed. 
At this point in our argument we might ask 
if there is not some way within the system other 
than fiscal orthodoxy for eliminating the infla-
tion originating in the State deficit. This way is 
certainly not that of monetary orthodoxy, which 
cannot be a valid substitute for the former, 
since it is not possible to neutralize the creation 
of money from fiscal sources by restricting the 
money available to private activity. Such an 
opinion would make sense to those who con-
sider that inflation can be corrected simply by 
controlling the quantity of money. However, 
paradoxical though it may seem, fiscal infla-
tion, far from requiring a smaller quantity of 
money for private activity, actually requires 
greater creation of money than before. 
The explanation for this is very simple. 
Thus, fiscal inflation first causes prices to rise 
and inflates the surplus at the final goods stage. 
And this phenomenon moves backwards 
through all the stages of the production pro-
cess, inflating the partial surpluses, so that the 
companies need more money than before for 
their circulating capital. If the monetary au-
thority refuses to grant it, there will inevitably 
be a recession or a contraction, depending on 
the degree of credit restriction, as we explained 
before when discussing redistributive pres-
sure. Of course these adverse effects tend to 
expand the fiscal deficit 
There are usually other reasons, however, 
for resorting to the restriction of credit. To 
contain the inflationary effect of the deficit, it is 
also recommended that the savings of the pub-
lic should be used, and this additional demand 
for savings causes interest rates to rise in the 
financial market. Why is it then necessary to 
raise the interest on bank money? For a very 
simple reason; without this increase, there 
would be a risk that part of the money created in 
response to the growth of production in prog-
ress might be diverted to the public sector (or 
abroad), so that a part of the fiscal deficit would 
be covered by bank money rather than savings. 
This is why it is necessary to raise the bank 
interest rates, confusing them with those of 
genuine savings. To achieve this purpose the 
banks are forced to restrict credit to private 
sector companies, to the detriment of the 
growth of production in progress, i.e., at the 
cost of recession or contraction of the economy 
with the corresponding unemployment and 
decrease in savings, depending on the intensi-
ty of the restrictive policy. 
There is no doubt that inflation could be 
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contained, under this policy, but only by incur-
ring in an economic and social cost at this time 
which could be very considerable. 
A clear distinction whould be drawn be-
tween this case and the other in which unem-
ployment is unable to contain the inflationary 
spiral and the trade union and political power 
of labour prevents wages from being reduced. 
Recent examples of fiscal inflation have 
displayed certain notable consequences. Since 
domestic saving is not enough to compensate 
for the fiscal deficit, governments resort to 
external financing, and in order to make this 
procedure attractive, the bank interest rates are 
raised to the maximum through credit restric-
tion. 
Around this singular procedure, a new 
constellation of financial groups springs up 
which enthusiastically supports the restrictive 
policy, inasmuch as this extreme raising of rates 
leads to huge profit margins for the fortunate 
operators. 
But this is not the only result. When genu-
ine domestic saving is used, it is possible to 
contain fiscal inflation through the displace-
ment of consumption: the demand and con-
sumption of those who are saving is reduced in 
favour of the demand and consumption of the 
State (or of those who work in connexion with 
its investments). In contrast, when foreign 
funds are used there is no such compensation 
of demand and consumption. These funds have 
an inflationary effect similar to that which oc-
curs when domestic expansion of money is 
used to cover the deficit. There is, in effect, an 
1. Neoclassical theories and the periphery 
Why have neoclassical theories and their mon-
etarist derivations proved unable to explain the 
reality of the development of the periphery? 
Why are their recommendations counter-pro-
ductive when compared with the facts? 
The reason is that these theories ignore the 
inflationary increase in demand. But in this 
case the external imbalance caused by this 
increase is covered by the foreign funds which 
have flowed into the country. 
Furthermore, yet another inflationary ef-
fect is added. The companies try to transfer the 
extreme interest rates to prices, thus tending to 
aggravate the effect of this inflationary de-
mand. And if labour cannot exercise its power 
to seek compensation because of the military 
power, the high interest rates will eventually 
affect its reduced consumption. 
It is true that, strictly speaking, it would 
not be correct to blame this manipulation of the 
system on neoclassical theories: it is really a 
manipulation of these theories. But these are 
still not the only consequences.There is yet 
another: that of tempering the inflationary de-
mand caused by the inflow of external re-
sources (or other factors) by lowering tariffs so 
as to slow down the rise in prices in the name of 
neoclassical theories. And since this is not 
enough, overvaluation of the currency is re-
sorted to, preventing the exchange rate from 
adjusting to the domestic price rises. 
The consequences of this manipulation are 
much too well known for us to examine them 
here. Overvaluation stimulates imports (al-
ready stimulated by the drop in tariffs) and 
discourages exports. But the favoured groups 
do not worry about this, since the resulting 
deficit in the balance of payments is covered by 
new external credit, providing a new stimulus 
for the financial boom. 
structure of society. They thus ignore the per-
sistence of the surplus, a structural phenome-
non of appropriation of the fruits of technologi-
cal progress, which lies at the very root of social 
inequality. 
These theories also ignore the primordial 
role of monetary mechanisms which allow the 
owners of the means of production to appropri-
II 
Theories, self-interest and breaking of the rules 
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ate this surplus. It may thus be useful to sum-
marize what was explained above. 
The appropriation of the surplus comple-
tely invalidates the neoclassical reasoning 
about the social diffusion of the fruits of the 
growing productivity of the system. 
This reasoning leads neoclassical econo-
mists to abominate the trade union power of 
labour, since this power interferes with the 
laws of the marketplace and is alleged to coun-
teract the spontaneous tendency of the system 
towards distributive equilibrium (an integral 
part of general equilibrium). 
It is the logical conclusion of this reasoning 
that forms the basis for monetarism. Its virtue is 
precisely that it causes the contraction of the 
economy until unemployment allows the trade 
union's power to be overcome and forces them 
to accept a lowering of wages. This is not the 
way to reach distributive equilibrium, how-
ever, since the decline in wages makes it pos-
sible to fully restore both the surplus and its 
dynamic, and this is the basic inequality of the 
system. 
When labour has acquired a great deal of 
trade union and political power, however, the 
monetary mechanism for defending the surplus 
becomes obsolete and loses its effectiveness. 
Even in cases where labour finally has to give 
in, this is a temporary fact rather than a de-
finitive correction. 
Furthermore, according to this thesis, wa-
ges have to fall not only because they have 
progressed beyond the point required by the 
presumed equilibrium, but also so that the sur-
plus can recover what it had lost owing to the 
exaggerated growth of the State. This is why it 
is necessary to dismantle the latter, beginning 
with the social services. 
How could anyone imagine that labour, 
when it has acquired consciousness and power, 
will meekly accept the imposition of monetary 
mechanisms? 
The problem thus becomes insoluble, and 
the system ends in social inflation which tends 
to become an inherent feature of it. 
It is insoluble because of the system of 
appropriation of the fruits of technological pro-
gress and the dynamics of accumulation. This is 
the great problem which will have to be re-
solved sooner or later by the periphery —and 
also by the centres... 
Whatever the degree of purity of the orig-
inal theories may have been —and I believe it 
was very high— the later function of these 
theories has been to sustain peripheral capi-
talism, with its exclusive and conflictive ten-
dencies, and for this purpose it has used, among 
other methods, monetary mechanisms. These 
mechanisms are first useful for obtaining the 
surplus and later for defending it from labour 
and the State: they enshrine the bias of the 
system in favour of the upper strata, until the 
mechanisms become obsolete. 
These theories thus respond to the domi-
nant interests in the system. This is true not 
only in domestic development but also in re-
lations between the centres and the periphery. 
I am referring in this case to the dominant in-
terests which characterize the hegemony of the 
centres over the periphery. In the period be-
fore the world depression of the 1930s, the in-
fluence of the previous system of the interna-
tional division of labour was very great; under 
its sway, the periphery remained excluded 
from the industrialization process and was 
merely an appendix to the centres. 
When we thought that this system had 
been superseded once and for all, it unexpect-
edly resurfaced in the form of the so-called 
'open economy* policies. 
These policies are not usually rejected 
frankly and openly with regard to the indus-
trialization of the periphery, but it is usually 
held that they must be spontaneous, without 
protection or subsidies. The supporters of this 
reappearance of neoclassicism recognize, how-
ever, that the costs of peripheral industrializa-
tion are high compared with the technological 
and economic superiority of the centres. In any 
case, one must not interfere with the laws of the 
marketplace by using arbitrary expedients. If 
the costs are higher, they must be reduced. And 
the most expeditious means, according to them, 
is to reduce wages as much as is necessary for 
the industry to become competitive. 
There can be no doubt that the past system 
of the international division of labour fitted in 
very well with the interests of the centres. The 
industrialization of the periphery did not really 
interest them. In this sense it was usually as-
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serted that the solution to development did not 
lie there, but rather in the technification of 
primary production in order to lower costs and 
compete better in the international market. 
When the countries of the periphery, after 
the great world depression, began to think 
about these phenomena with independent 
judgement , they soon reacted against this the-
sis held by the centres. They did not deny the 
n e e d to introduce technological progress in 
primary activities, but they maintained that this 
could not be done outside the context of devel-
opment without leading to serious consequen-
ces, for if the productivity of these activities 
were to increase and the labour thus made re-
dundan t were not absorbed, the benefits of 
technological progress would be transferred to 
the centres, through the deterioration of the 
terms of trade. 
This was one of the theoretical justifica-
tions of industrialization: to contribute to the 
employment of the redundant labour force in 
activities of higher productivity. Industrializa-
tion and technological progress in primary ac-
tivities were thus integral and complementary 
parts of a single development policy. Imagine 
anything more opposed to the theory of lower-
ing wages in order to industrialize! 
Once peripheral industrialization was un-
derway, the centres resolved to take advantage 
of it. It was claimed that transnational corpora-
tions would bring with them a vigorous moder-
nization of industry: the doors should thus be 
thrown open to them. It was no longer a ques-
tion of denying industrialization but rather of 
giving it an international perspective. There 
was now a new thesis to talk about: the inter-
nationalization of production. 
In reality, however, it was not the interna-
tionalization of production in the periphery 
which interested the transnational s so much as 
its internationalization in the centres them-
selves, under the powerful thrust of technolog-
ical innovations leading to the ceaseless diver-
sification of goods and services. And the pe-
r iphery was once again left on the sidelines of 
this type of industrialization, except in relation 
to those goods which were no longer new. 
There was, moreover, an intense liberali-
zation of trade in which the periphery scarcely 
participated, for this liberalization did not ap-
ply to a comparable extent to those industrial 
goods in which the periphery had obtained or 
might obtain comparative advantages. 
As a result, the transnational corporations 
contributed much more to the internationaliza-
tion of consumption in the periphery than to 
the internationalization of production there. 
Thus , we again see the importance of the self-
interest of the centres. 
I have been referring to the industrial 
trans national s which have acquired so much 
influence in the international field. They now 
share their enormous power with the financial 
trans nationals, i.e., with a few private banking 
institutions which have rapidly evolved due to 
the Eurodollar market, which we will discuss 
later. These transnationals played a very useful 
role when the rise in oil prices led to a large 
deficit in the importing countries. But they lat-
er offered credit for the payment of these grow-
ing imports, which often included consumer 
goods. The results are well known: growing 
indebtedness in order to make payments of 
capital and interest. The position of some de-
veloping countries is a matter of serious con-
cern, not only because of the magnitude of the 
debt , bu t also because the recession in the 
centres makes it impossible to pay it back 
through corresponding exports. 
This is a case of significant lack of fore-
sight, both on the part of the private interna-
tional banks and of the debtors, which was 
fostered in the case of the banks by the enor-
mous gains involved. 
As for the debtor countries of the periph-
ery, they have often allowed themselves to be 
seduced by this type of operation because it 
enabled them to avoid taking indispensable 
readjusment measures. Moreover, they have 
more than once been persuaded that they 
should open their economies on a massive 
scale to external finance closely linked to trade 
openness . 
Those in favour of 'open economy' policies 
strongly oppose selective measures in regard to 
imports such as were adopted in previous pe-
riods when there was a trade imbalance: such 
artificial interference in the laws of the market-
place must be avoided, they say, and the trade 
balance must be corrected in some other way, 
ei ther by using credit facilities or by restricting 
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credit in order to cause contraction and thus 
reduce imports at the expense of economic ac-
tivity. 
Here too there as been a lamentable theo-
retical regression, since the public internatio-
nal financial bodies themselves had finally 
recognized —very late in the game, it is true— 
that structural imbalances were occurring in 
the relations with the centres which also re-
quired structural readjustments. I very much 
fear that we are returning to the seriously mis-
taken theoretical concepts of previous eras. 
This is a new manifestation of the return to 
orthodoxy! 
However, it would be a grave error always 
to see behind the theories elaborated in the 
centres themselves the predominant influence 
of the interests which weigh so heavily on the 
periphery. What is occurring now in the central 
countries is a clear demonstration that some of 
the theories prevailing there do not fit in either 
with the profound structural changes which 
have occurred in the centre. 
I am afraid that in making this assertion I 
may be accused of having the arbitrary attitude 
of looking at certain phenomena in the centres 
from the viewpoint of the periphery. I never-
theless maintain that a structural imbalance is 
occurring there between consumption and ac-
cumulation similar to that in the periphery, and 
it is in fact a structural crisis. 
2. The crisis in the centres 
Advanced capitalism is in the midst of a crisis. 
It is not surprising that the situation is fre-
quently compared to the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. However, they are two different 
phenomena. The crisis of the 1930s was con-
junctural, albeit of extraordinary severity. In 
contrast, the present crisis basically represents 
a structural imbalance between consumption 
and accumulation, as in the Latin American 
periphery, which does not appear to have oc-
curred previously, since this imbalance is the 
result of the evolution of the structure of society 
and of the power relations arising within it. 
This crisis was incubating right through 
the long years of the boom period in the centres 
which ended in the first half of the 1970s. It is 
not the result of the decadence of capitalism, 
but rather of its over-vigorous development, 
which has caused it to overflow its banks with-
out finding a new course. And the result of all 
this has been social inflation which, as in the 
periphery, cannot be attacked effectively by 
using monetary mechanisms. 
In order to understand the nature of the 
structural imbalance between consumption 
and accumulation, it is worth recalling what 
was said about the dynamic sequence which 
characterizes a growing economy, whatever 
the economic and social system. The accumu-
lation of reproductive capital is an essential 
condition for an increase in employment and 
productivity, which, in turn, is an essential 
condition for the growth of accumulation; and 
so on. Thus, if the rate of accumulation drops, 
productivity will also drop. 
In my opinion, this is what has occurred 
in the centres, beginning with the United 
States. Despite the very high level of produc-
tivity, this has proved insufficient to meet the 
growth of various forms of consumption. On top 
of the growing and increasingly diversified 
consumption of the upper strata of society, 
there has been added that of the middle and, 
finally, the lower strata, while the trade union 
and political power of labour has been getting 
stronger as the structural changes in the society 
occur. Yet this is not happening at the expense 
of the consumption of the upper strata but is 
rather being imposed on it, in regard to both the 
private consumption and the social consump-
tion of labour, especially through the interme-
diary of the State. The same occurs with the 
growth of the civil and military consumption of 
the latter. 
It should not surprise us, then, that over 
time the growth rate of consumption has 
tended to exceed that of accumulation. More-
over, only a part of the latter corresponds to 
reproductive capital which augments produc-
tivity as well as employment, another part 
which tends to show relative growth corre-
sponds to forms of accumulation which do not 
have this virtue, as in the obvious case of capital 
which is accumulated to respond to the needs 
of military consumption. In addition, there 
tends to be an increase in the proportion of 
capital used for the constant diversification of 
goods and services rather than for productivity. 
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All this negatively influences the rate of pro-
ductivity, although other factors are involved as 
well. 
It should be taken into account, on the 
other hand, that in the past higher productivity 
has been due not only to technological innova-
tions but also to the irresponsible use of a non-
renewable natural resource —oil. To correct 
this phenomenon, there would have to be a 
greater investment ofcapital per unit of energy, 
and thus per product unit, unless greater ener-
gy efficiency is achieved. 
The same is true of measures designed to 
defend the environment from all the forms of 
pollution which have been destroying it. 
Consequently, serious measures for the 
readjustment of consumption are called for in 
order to raise the rate of accumulation of re-
productive capital, employment and productiv-
ity, and to respond to the various requirements 
for ecological defence measures in regard to 
energy and the environment. 
How is this to be done? This is the funda-
mental problem which is still far from being 
resolved, since there is no mechanism in the 
system, for regulating consumption and ac-
cumulation, nor has any theoretical explana-
tion been offered for these phenomena which 
might serve as a guide for practical action. 
In order to correct the inflationary conse-
quences of the fiscal deficit, recourse is being 
had, just as in some countries in the periphery, 
to the procurement of public savings in order to 
support government consumption, by means of 
compressing the consumption of those who are 
saving. Because of the magnitude of the deficit, 
extremely high interest rates are being used to 
obtain the necessary saving. Moreover, in order 
to ensure that these rates do not result in any 
transfer of bank money to the financial market, 
the interest rates on money from the latter are 
also raised by virtue of credit restrictions. 
These restrictions in turn lead to recession —at 
the very least— and unemployment, and the 
latter, besides shrinking savings, expands the 
fiscal deficit. 
I admit that it is possible to sharply reduce 
or even eliminate inflation in this way, but at 
great economic and social cost, not only for the 
United States but also for the rest of the world 
and most especially the periphery. It is a policy 
which, in addition to being counterproductive, 
falls far short of offering a fundamental solu-
tion, since sooner or later credit will have to be 
expanded and interest rates lowered, with the 
resulting inflationary effects as explained 
above. 
Of course this brief and superficial over-
view of the situation of the centres was not 
undertaken out of mere intellectual curiosity, 
but in order to explain the structural nature of 
this crisis. It is no longer possible to counteract 
the crisis, as in the 1930s, with a Keynesian 
expansive policy, unless this is combined with 
other fundamental measures which are slow in 
coming. My conclusion is that there are no 
grounds for expecting a lasting improvement in 
the economies of the centres. The periphery 
should therefore prepare itself for a serious pro-
longation of this crisis and seek basically to 
make use of its own potential for development, 
although this should be done in such a way that 
if this hypothesis does not come true, the peri-
phery can take advantage of the additional 
stimulus which the hoped-for economic re-
covery of the centres would bring with it. 
3. World inflation and peripheral 
open-economy policies 
There is one very important comment that 
remains to be made: inflation in the United 
States has expanded beyond its national bor-
ders. This has had the advantage of alleviating 
the domestic pressure of consumption on ac-
cumulation, since the economy has been able 
to take advantage of part of the product of the 
rest of the world, paying for this contribution 
with dollars which ended up being non-con-
vertible. 
This was a new blow —added to that suf-
fered during the Great Depression— to what 
was left of the gold standard, which has now 
been destroyed without trace. 
In reality, the Bretton Woods agreements 
already marked the demise of the gold 
standard, whose role was henceforth to be 
played by the dollar, thus giving the United 
States an enormous responsibility that it has 
proved incapable of carrying out. 
Together with this responsibility it re-
ceived a right of seigneurage by which it was 
able to create for its own advantage the money 
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required for the expansion of world trade. This 
arrangement freed the world currency from the 
shortage of the precious metal, but instead of 
dollars being created in response to these trade 
requirements, they were created mainly in re-
sponse to the redistributive struggle and the 
fiscal deficit. 
Be that as it may, the fact is that inflationary 
dollars flooded the world. The dollar assumed 
the role of international as well as national cur-
rency, although it was not subject to the strict 
laws of the gold standard. Quite on the con-
trary, it was not subject to any monetary disci-
pline whatever. 
The inflationary abundance of this cur-
rency generated the Eurodollar market. Since 
the countries receiving them were worried lest 
they should give rise to an exaggerated domes-
tic expansion of money, they returned part of 
their holdings to this market, generally in the 
form of short-term loans. These operations, of 
course, further accentuated the inflationary 
pressure; for each unit of money, two or three 
more have been created, in the same way that 
the money from bank reserves multiplies do-
mestically. But contrary to what occurs domes-
tically in each country, these Eurodollar opera-
tions are not subject to any control. 
What happens is that when money is 
loaned in the Eurodollar market, it does not 
necessarily represent saving on the part of 
those who have received dollars for their ex-
ternal transactions —that is, genuine saving— 
as has always occurred in the case of interna-
tional long-term loans. Instead, it mainly repre-
sents dollars which multiply in an inflationary 
manner as indicated. 
This is another of the paradigms on which 
monetarist open economy policies are built: 
the idea that countries should resolutely enter 
the international market, as if it corresponded 
to the past image of the gold standard. 
In line with this concept of open economy 
policies, a monetarist theory of the balance of 
payments has arisen, which rejects any reason 
for intervention by the monetary authority in 
regard to fluctuations which originate outside 
the country. If these cause a surplus, they 
claim, then the domestic interest rates will 
drop and the money which is not needed in the 
country will flow out of it; the opposite will 
occur when there is a deficit . This is a very 
unrealistic picture of what actually happens in 
the cyclical reality of our countries. When the 
domestic interest rates drop due to the inflow of 
external funds, this heightens the tendency to 
misuse credit, and this makes it more difficult 
for the cyclical decline to occur. The monetary 
authority then has to act in various ways, and I 
believe that I have gained some positive expe-
rience in this respect when I had some respon-
sibility for the monetary policy of my country. 
It is clear that when there is an abundance 
of dollars which the big international private 
banks want to loan, the open economy policy is 
very attractive. But how long will it continue to 
be so? The gold standard did not work this way. 
The interplay of interest rates occurred primar-
ily among the big countries. 
Neither does trade openness attract me. It 
is a well-known fact that the centres either do 
not follow the rules of the game of the inter-
national division of labour, or else the rules 
they do follow are incompatible with the devel-
opment of our countries. I will not deal with 
this subject now. I only want to refer to the 
serious impact that this second great crisis of 
capitalism is having. Can we talk about uncon-
ditional open economy policies when faced 
with the decline in the growth rates of the 
centres and the reappearance of protectionism? 
It is paradoxical that the return to orthodoxy 
coincides with this phenomenon which is so 
contrary to the comparative advantages of the 
periphery. 
We must not confuse trade openness with 
the rational linking-up of the periphery with 
the centres. The great error of the open econ-
omy policy is not that it proclaims comparative 
advantages —to deny them would be absurd— 
but that it assumes that the dismantling of pro-
tections and subsidies would allow us to profit 
from these advantages fully. 
I hope that the foregoing reflections will 
serve to temper the enthusiasm of those who, in 
their desire to imitate, let themselves be se-
duced not only by the theories of the centres 
but also by the manner in which the latter at-. 
tack their own problems. This observation not 
only corresponds to the present crisis of capital-
ism but also to the previous one: the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. 
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Let me say a few words about the latter. 
What appeared in the beginning to be a simple 
cyclical decline turned into an intense eco-
nomic contraction; the immediate origin of this 
phenomenon was, in my opinion, the brutal 
restriction of credit to which the stock market 
crash led in the United States. Instead of this 
policy, it would have been advisable to use a 
policy of government expansion to deal with it. 
But the new Keynesian ideas, which were just 
beginning, took a long time to penetrate, being 
considered heresies although they were later 
incorporated into orthodox thinking. 
On all this were superimposed the tragic 
consequences of the sharp increase in import 
duties. The world contraction, the drop in 
prices and protectionism all led to a great ex-
ternal imbalance in the rest of the world, in 
contrast with the impressive accumulation of 
gold by the United States. The rest of the world 
had to defend itself through bilateralism, 
which restricted imports from the United 
States while trying to maintain imports from 
countries which could be paid with exports. 
The multilateral trade and payments sys-
tem which appeared to have been built on solid 
foundations, with a longstanding history inter-
rupted only by the First World War, was thus 
destroyed, and the gold standard system suf-
fered a hard blow from which it never recov-
ered. 
As is well known, the consequences of 
these crises have lasted a long time; indeed, 
they have dominated the greater part of the half 
century which has passed since the Great De-
pression. But scarcely had the world recovered 
from the consequences of the latter when the 
Second World War occurred, followed by the 
serious difficulties of the post-war era. There 
then occurred the extraordinary boom which 
lasted until the first half of the 1970s, only to be 
followed by the present crisis, which seems to 
me to be more profund, complex and difficult 
than the Great Depression. 
I have had the rare privilege —in academic 
terms, of course— of having worked as a young 
economist during the first great crisis and the 
Second World War, and of now witnessing the 
present crisis. In those days we had to impro-
vise defence measures which were the begin-
ning of an autonomous development effort. 
And today we are also being forced to defend 
ourselves from the vicissitudes of the centres 
and seek new development paths. There is 
much to be discussed before selecting our 
course of action. 
In my long lifetime, between these two 
extremes of the great world crises, I have 
had the opportunity to participate in the ini-
tial struggles of UNCTAD to obtain from the 
centres a more enlightened policy of co-opera-
tion with the periphery. 
Nothing important was achieved then or 
later. However, it must be acknowledged that 
in the long years ofprosperity which came to an 
end in the first half of the 1970s the concern of 
the Latin American periphery about the nega-
tive attitude of the centres began to weaken in 
view of the positive consequences of the ex-
traordinary rates of development achieved, 
which had never occurred before so persisten-
tly. Thanks to this prosperity, the most industri-
alized developing countries embarked upon 
the export of industrial goods. They strove to 
persuade the centres to liberalize the importa-
tion of goods in which they had comparative 
advantages. But they did not succeed. 
Despite this fact, these exports were suc-
cessful, since the high growth rates of the 
centres made it possible in many cases to over-
come the obstacles in their path. 
It is perfectly understandable that this 
boom should have appeared to be the begin-
ning of a new and very promising era. The 
periphery allowed itself to be dazzled, and in 
view of the success of its exports it did not 
rationally pursue the import substitution re-
quired by the symmetry of the process of in-
dustrialization. This error was analogous to that 
which had been committed earlier in the op-
posite sense, when development was held to 
be more important than the process of substi-
tution. 
These observations are not intended to put 
on paper what is still fresh in the memory of one 
who had to act in those tempestuous times, nor 
merely to explain my serious concerns today. I 
am writing for another reason, since those of us 
who were neoclassicists had to deal with phe-
nomena which were outside the field of theory 
During the Great Depression, the centres had 
stopped being an examplary model of opera-
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tion, a paradigm for our countries to identify 
with. What is equally important, we stopped 
accepting with reverence the theories devel-
oped there, and as a result of passing through so 
many vicissitudes we began to seek our own 
developmental path. 
Thirty years ago, the periphery had begun 
a tenacious and difficult attempt to emancipate 
itself intellectually. It was learning to question 
those theories developed in the centres which 
did not fit in with the basic interests of periph-
eral development. The return to conventional 
theories in recent years has represented an at-
tempt to counteract this effort aimed at inde-
pendent thinking about development. The 
seductiveness of these theories is very power-
ful, and it clouds their new proponents' view of 
reality so that they are unable to perceive 
clearly the interplay of internal and external 
interests behind these new manifestations of 
conventional thinking. 
Now is the time to pursue this effort at 
intellectual emancipation. We must now ad-
vance in broader fields and include in our 
thinking an examination of the structure of the 
society, without which both the theory and the 
practice of development will continue to drift 
from their proper paths. 
